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STUDENT NoTEs
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN KENTUCKY
Banks and trust companies have been engaging regularly and
for compensation as a part of their business in such acts as the
drafting of wills, deeds, mortgages, trust instruments, and other
legal documents; giving legal advice to customers regarding wills,
beneficiaries, estates, and the disposition of estates; conducting neces-
sary litigation through permanently employed attorneys or other
hired employees in the course of their powers as trustee; and they
have advertised for and solicited such business under the provisions
of Kentucky Revised Statutes 30.170, which reads in part:
"(1) The Court of Appeals shall adopt and promul-
gate rules:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(3) No rule adopted and promulgated under this
section shall prevent a person not holding himself out as
a practicing attorney from writing a deed, mortgage, or
will, or prevent a person from drawing any instrument to
which he is a party."
Since 1901 they have done so with the apparent approval of the
courts, except, perhaps, as far as conducting litigation is concerned.
In Dunlap v. Lebus,' decided in that year, the Court held that a
license to practice law was not required to authorize plaintiff to
perform services in securing the reduction of a tax claim against
defendant, as such services could be performed by a layman as well
as a lawyer, and besides were not rendered in court. This is the
first of two cases decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky on the
unauthorized practice of law by persons who are not licensed to
practice.
In 1937 the Court of Appeals defined the practice of law when
it held, in Howton v. Morrow, "Practicing law is not confined to
performing services in actions or proceedings in courts of
justice .... "I
1112 Ky. 237, 65 S.W. 441 (1901).
'269 Ky. 1, 106 S.W. 2d 81 (1907).
'Accord, People v. Ring, 70 P. 2d 281 (Cal. 1937); Boykin,
Soliciter Gen. v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); In re
Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P. 2d 535 (1938); People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Ass'n. v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. 2d 941 (1937); People
ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers of Ill., 354
Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); Barr v. Cardell, 173 Iowa 18, 155 N.W.
312 (1915); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919);
Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540
(1936); Cain v. Merchant's Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746,
268 N.W. 719 (1936); Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934); Rhode Island State Bar Ass'n.
v. Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935); In re
Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210, 24 LRA (NS) 750, 18 Ann. Cas.
657 (1909).
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The Court in Howton v. Morrow, supra, also set dowi some of
the acts comprehended in the practice of law when it said, "Practic-
ing law . . . includes giving advice and preparing wills, contracts,
deeds, mortgages and other instruments of a legal nature."'
In two later decisions 'the Court stated that a corporation could
not be licensed to practice law. In this the Court is in accord with
the great majority of jurisdictions which have ruled on this
question.'
In addition to the above decisions there were in effect at the
time the second unauthorized practice case came before the Court,
the statute quoted above (KRS 30.170) and Rule 18 of the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky which reads:
"'The practice of law' is any service rendered for a
consideration involving legal knowledge or legal advice,
whether of representation, counsel, advocacy, in or out of
court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the
services. But nothing herein shall prevent any person
not holding himself out as a practicing attorney from
writing a deed, mortgage, or will without consideration
unto himself for such service, and nothing herein shall
prevent any natural person from drawing any instrument
to which he is a party without consideration unto him-
self therefor."'
At the time the case of Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co? came be-
fore the Court this was the state of the law as it pertained to the
question of the unauthorized practice of law by persons who are not
licensed to practice.
On September 27, 1946, The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
handed down the decision in the Hobson case. While this decision
covered a number of legal questions of interest, for the purpose of
'Accord, In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 274,
288 Pac. 157 (1930); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n. v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 244 111. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Barr v.
Cardell, 173 Iowa 18, 155 N.W. 312 (1915); State ex inf. Miller,
Circuit Atty., v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 355 Mo. 845, 74 S.W. 2d
348 (1934); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919);
Hexter Title and Abstract Co., Inc. v. Grievance Committee, Fifth
Congressional District, State Bar of Texas, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.
2d 946 (1944); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. 2d 401 (1932).
'Kendall v. Beiing, 295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W. 2d 489 (1943); Mutual
Bankers Corporation v. Covington Bros. and Co., 277 Ky. 33, 125
S.W. 2d 202 (1938).
'Boykin, Soliciter Gen. v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796
(1932); People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Tax-
payers of Ill., 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); People ex rel.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n. v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479,
92 N.E. 15 (1910); Land Title and Abstract Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934).
1 Rules of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, now cited as
Section 3.020.
'- Ky. , S.W. 2d (1946).
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this discussion we will limit ourselves to the consideration of only
a few of the questions involved.
The "practice of law" was held to include "the writing of wills,
deeds, conveyances and other legal documents requiring expert
knowledge and equipment in their phraseology so as to comport with
the law relating to such matters; or engaging in preparing any instru-
ment wherein it" (the bank, trust company, or association) "is desig-
nated as fiduciary to enforce and administer the provisions in same,
or to hold itself out as possessing the requisite knowledge to do so."
However the Court stated further, "If however, the maker of such
an instrument on isolated occasions should apply without solicitation
on his own volition to defendants to act as the maker's amanuensis
in framing the instrument he desires to execute, and for which de-
fendant receives no compensation, it may perform such duty, and
likewise it may, for and on behalf of itself beneficially, prepare
any instrument creating such benefit to itself as a 'party' thereto, but
all other acts charged in the petition, and admitted by defendants,
should be permanently enjoined."
"Other acts charged in the petition" and which are permanently
enjoined by the Court in this case are: (1) "drafting wills, deeds,
trust instruments, and other legal documents in which it" (the
bank or trust company) "is appointed for compensation, as agent
or other fiduciary that may be required to carry out the provisions
of a particular writing"; (2) giving "legal advice to the maker of
such document with reference to the disposition or transmission of
estates, as well as the rights of the beneficiaries and other
pecuniarily interested parties therein"; (3) engaging "in the practice
of law by conducting necessary litigation, through its permanently
employed attorneys, or other hired employees that may be required
of it as the duly appointed fiduciary, in the administration of its
powers conferred upon it as such."
In answer to defendant's contention that since under the excerpt
it is party to the instruments, the terms of which it enforces in its
capacity as fiduciary, the statute prevents the Court from declaring
in its Rule 18, that the practice of law shall be limited to natural
persons, the Court held that the excerpt is not susceptible of the con-
struction placed upon it, and that "the word 'party' in that excerpt
clearly means one who has a beneficial interest in the corpus of the
estate being administered by the fiduciary, and does not apply to a
fiduciary whose duties are purely ministerial." Thus Rule 18 was
upheld.
It was held also that a corporation could not qualify so as to
obtain a license to practice law.
In holding an injunction a proper remedy in situations of this
kind the Court said: "The remedy of injunction to prevent un-
licensed persons from practicing law, notwithstanding the offender
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may be punished by attached penalties, or by contempt proceedings,
is quite universally recognized by courts and text writers. ... '
On the question of what branch of the government controls the
rules of practice and procedure, the Court reaffirmed its decision in
Burton v. Mayer" in which it said: "Rules of practice and procedure
are, fundamentally, matters within the judicial power and subject
to the control of the courts in the administration of justice. The
courts accept legislative co-operation in rendering the judiciary more
effective. They deny the right of legislative dominance in matters
of this kind.""
The decision in the Hobson case will be a severe blow to those
firms in Kentucky which are engaged in the acts held therein to
constitute the practice of law. The definition of the practice of law
as laid down in previous Kentucky cases' has been enlarged con-
siderably, and a clarification of the power of the Court in this re-
spect has been made.
In addition to the acts laid down in the Hobson case as being
unauthorized practice of law, it is believed that under Rule 18' the
Court will, in any future case to come before it on this matter, in-
terpret Rule 18 in accordance with the holdings of the highest courts
of our sister states. This would include a holding that the drafting
-KY.R.S. 30.990. (1) "Any person who violates any of the pro-
visions of KY.R.S. 30.010 shall be fined not less than twenty-five
dollari nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense." KY.R.S.
30.010 forbids the practice of law without a license; People ex rel.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n. v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); cf. Depew v. Wichita Ass'n. of Credit Men,
142 Kan. 403, 49 P. 2d 1041 (1935), certiorari denied, 297 U.S. 710,
56 S. Ct. 574, 80 L. Ed. 997 (1936); State Bar of Oklahoma v. Retail
Credit Ass'n., 170 Okla. 246, 37 P. 2d 954 (1934), 5 A. Jur. 272, Sect.
17; Nelson v. Smith, - Utah - , 154 P. 2d 634, 157 ALR 512
(1944); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. 2d 401 (1932).
10274 Ky. 263, 267, 118 S.W. 2d 547, 549 (1938).
Cf. People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n. v. Peoples Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Commonwealth
ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Furste, 288 Ky. 631, 157 S.W. 2d 59 (1941); In
re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. 2d 194 (1936); Rhode Island State
Bar Ass'n. v. Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139
(1935).
'Mutual Bankers Corporation v. Covington Bros. and Co., 277
Ky. 33, 125 S.W. 2d 202 (1938); Howton v. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1, 106
S.W. 2d 81 (1937); Kendall v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 789, 790, 175 S.W.
2d 489, 493 (1943).
"Rules of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, now cited as
Section 3.020.
" Cf. People ex rel. Chicago State Bar Ass'n. v. Motorists Ass'n.
of Illinois, 354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E. 827 (1933); People ex rel. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n., v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 318 (1931); Howton v. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1, 106 S.W. 2d 81
(1937); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930); People
v. Lawyer's Title Corporation, 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E. 2d 30 (1940);
Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio 23, 193
N.E. 650 (1934); Hexter Title and Abstract Co., Inc. v. Grievance
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of wills, deeds, mortgages, and other legal documents, as well as the
giving of any legal advice by an attorney employed by a firm or
corporation to a customer of said firm or corporation for considera-
tion is the practice of law. There is dictum to that effect in the
Hobson case.
In People v. Lawyers Title Corporations the Court held that the
statutory provisions exempting a corporation engaged in the ex-
amination and issuing of titles to real estate from the prohibition
against practicing law has no application whatever to services which
cannot lawfully be rendered by a person not admitted to the practice
of law in the State of New York.
The Rhode Island Court, in Rhode Island State ,Bar Association
v. Automobile Service Association,"' was in accord with the New
York Court when it held that an association of proprietors of an
automobile service association contracting with customers to furnish
legal advice and assistance, with a licensed member of the Bar, did
not absolve the proprietors from responsibility for the unauthorized
practice of law.
Of the numerous arguments for holding that a corporation can-
not hire attorneys to carry on the business of practicing law for it,"
two are particularly persuasive: (1) in all cases the attorney is not
controlled by the client but by the corporation for which he works,
and (2) the corporation is interested in the outcome of the trans-
action in most cases.
In regard to the first point the Court, in In re Co-Operative Law
Company' said:
"The relation of attorney and client is that of master
and servant in a limited and dignified sense, and it in-
volves the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be
delegated without consent, and it cannot exist between an
attorney employed by a corporation to practice law for it,
and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject
Committee, Fifth Congressional District, State Bar of Texas, 142
Tex. 506, 179 S.W. 2d 946 (1944); Rhode Island State Bar Ass'n. v.
Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935). Contra:
Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W.
719 (1936).
282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E. 2d 30 (1940).
'55 R. I. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935).
" People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n. v. Peoples Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); In re Otterness, 181
Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198
N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc.,
209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936); Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank and
Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936); Rhode Island State Bar
Ass'n. v. Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R.I. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935);
Hexter Title and Abstract Co., Inc. v. Grievance Committee, Fifth
Congressional District, State Bar of Texas, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W
2d 946 (1944); State ex rel. Ludin, Pros. Atty., v. Merchants Pro-
tective Corporation, 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
"198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
to the direction of the corporation, and not to the directions
of the client. There would be neither contract nor privity
between him and the client, and he would not owe even
the duty of counsel to the actual litigant. The corporation
would control the litigation, the money earned would be-
long to the corporation, and the attorney would be re-
sponsible to the corporation only. His master would not
be the client but the corporation ..
A concrete situation in which the corporation did actually control
the attorney is met with in Hexter Title and Abstract Co., Inc. v.
Grievance Committee, Fifth Congressional District, State Bar of
Texas" where the Court held the corporation was practicing law
through a hired attorney, and in its decision said:
"The fact that the corporation has several licensed
lawyers in its employment to prepare the instruments in
question does not alter the case. According to the agreed
statement of facts the executive officers of the corpora-
tion direct the kind of instruments to be drawn and what
should be put in them. But even in the absence of such
direction by the executives the result would be the same.
The attorney in preparing such papers does so as the agent
of the corporation by whom he is employed. His first
obligation of loyalty is to the corporation. His acts are
the acts of the corporation and even though the corpora-
tion acts through an attorney, it is nevertheless practicing
law."
As to the question of consideration, there is no doubt that where
mortgages are foreclosed by advertisement and the attorney's fee is
included in the costs there is consideration moving to the
corporation."
The probability is that if such acts as are held to be the practice
of law are done without consideration of any sort the individual or
corporation would not, under the Kentucky rule as it stands today,
be found guilty of practicing law provided it refrained from con-
ducting litigation in court. However, it is thought that the definition
of "valuable consideration" will be broadened considerably should
occasion present that question to the Court.
It has been held that where as a part of a job for a customer
a corporation drafts instruments for said customer and where there
is no direct charge for the drafting of such instrument, there is,
nevertheless, consideration where the customer pays for the service
as a whole despite the fact that the corporation advertises that the
drafting of such instruments is gratis.'
142 Tex. 566, 179 S.W. 2d 946, 953 (1944).
-In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930).
State ex inf. Miller, Circuit Atty., v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
335 Mo. 845, 74 S.W. 2d. 348 (1934); Hexter Title and Abstract Co.,
Inc. v. Grievance Committee, Fifth Congressional District, State Bar
of Texas, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W. 2d 946 (1944); State ex rel. Ludin,
Pros. Atty., v. Merchants Protective Corporation, 105 Wash. 12, 177
Pac. 694 (1919).
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In State ex inf. Miller, Circuit Attorney v. St. Louis Union Trust
Company,' the Court said: "Nomination of a trust company as ex-
ecutor or trustee is 'valuable consideration' for drafting of wills and
trust agreements...."' and later ". . we may say respondent's
services here in question 'are not eleemosynary'. They are part of a
total for which the estate of the maker of the will or trust pays, and
the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to particular
services other than those in question is not important.
2'
Should the question of the illegal practice of law by a corporation
through an attorney where the attorney's work is entirely out of
court come before the Court, it is believed that the Court will rule
in accordance with the spirit of the decisions cited above, which
decisions represent the majority rule. The trend today, and properly
so, is toward a much stricter limitation on the practice of law by
unlicensed persons and corporations.
In view of the decision in the Hobson case, supra, and taking
into consideration the trend of the law on the matter of the un-
authorized practice of law as is shown by the recent decisions in
the United States, it is believed that the day when a corporation
could provide a person with a will, handle all litigations pertaining
thereto, and act as trustee of the estate has passed in Kentucky.
A bank or a trust company can no longer be a "general store" so to
speak, with everything, legal as well as the usual banking and trust
business, for sale. These corporations will be limited to their proper
role and will not be enabled to spread their conquests further.
J. PELHAM JOHNSTON
S74 S.W. 2d 348 (Mo. 1934).
Id. at 357.
21 Ibid.
